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I.

Although present in germ from the first Christian century, Catholic social
thought began to emerge as a unified body of doctrine in the nineteenth century,
first in the condemnations issued by Pope Pius IX (r. 1846-1878) and later in the
prolific and forward-looking teaching of Pope Leo XIII (r. 1878-1903). Pius IX’s
Syllabus of Errors (1864) established that the Church would not accede to the
deracinated and dissolved world imposed with relentless violence by the
revolutionaries of 1789. Pius also recognized, however, that wholesale restoration
of the ancien regime was out of the question. It thus fell to his successor, Leo, and to
Leo’s successors to recover and apply the enduring principles of a sound social
order.
In the social order ripped to bloody shreds by the revolutionaries, the norm
had been for the Church to be the soul of the body politic. 1 Church and state, though
distinct, were to constitute a union -- the union of throne and altar. The Church
served as the conscience of the state; the state served the common goods, both
natural and, indirectly, supernatural. This was the logic of Christendom, the ideal of
a Christian commonwealth. Separation, where it occurred, was an objectionable
aberration. Not always achieved in practice, union remained both the ideal and the
normal structure.
The dissolvent experiences of the nineteenth century taught the popes that
the Church’s place in the world had to be defended, both de facto and de jure. The
normal structure had been obliterated, the ideal widely rejected. Faced with
“rhetorical adrenaline” 2 and pathological violence on behalf of a laicized state, the
question the popes had to answer was this: What was the rightful place of the
See John Dickinson’s introduction to John of Salisbury. 1927. The Statesman’s
Book of John of Salisbury. Trans. J. Dickinson. New York: Alfred Knopf. Xvii-lxxxii.
Berman, Harold J. 1983. Law and revolution: the formation of the Western legal
tradition. Cambridge: Harvard. 276-88.
2 Schama, Simon. 1989. Citizens: a chronicle of the French revolution. New York:
Knopf. 906.
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Church, in all of her pluriform institutional manifestations, in the emergent social
order? The Church was fighting for her life, and the transcendent issue faced by the
popes was how to differentiate the Church and the rest of the social order without
reducing the Church either to a private association like any other or, perhaps worse,
to a formless aggregate of members. 3
The response of the popes, assisted by philosophers and theologians and
other experts, proceeded apace, and by 1931 Pope Pius XI (r. 1922-39) would say
that he inherited a body of social “doctrine” handed on from the time of Leo. 4 Pius
said this in Quadragesimo anno, the encyclical that gave the principle of subsidiarity
-- a key component of the socio-political order affirmed by the Church in response to
the social dissolution wrought by the revolutionaries -- its first, and canonical,
formulation in Catholic social doctrine. Down to the present, the popes have
continued to develop the entire body of social doctrine, by way of clarification and
application, thereby shedding further light on the significance of subsidiarity and its
relationship to the other principles comprised by this doctrine, including the
common good, social justice, and solidarity. Subsidiarity is not, as it is sometimes
said to be, a free-standing principle, but one among several principles of a unified
and developing body of doctrine. But what is this body of thought known as
Catholic social doctrine, and of what does it consist?
The Church’s social doctrine, Pope John Paul II (r. 1978-2004) explained,
“belongs to the field, not of ideology, but of theology and particularly of moral
theology.” 5 Catholic social doctrine is, the Pope continued:
the accurate formulation of the results of a careful reflection on the
complex realities of human existence, in society and in the international
order, in the light of faith and of the Church’s tradition. Its main aim is to
interpret these realities, determining their conformity with or divergence
from the lines of the Gospel teaching on man and his vocation, a vocation
which is at once earthly and transcendent; its aim is thus to guide
Christian behavior. 6

Weber, Wilhelm. 1981. Society and state as a problem for the Church. In: Jedin H
(ed.) History of the Church. The Church in the modern age, vol. 10. New York:
Crossroad. 229-59.
4 Pope Pius XI (1931). Encyclical letter Quadragesimo anno Nos. 18-21. Available
via http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_pxi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno_en.html See also Pontifical Council for
Justice and Peace, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church. 2004. Rome:
Libreria Editrice Vaticana. No. 87. Available via
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_
pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html
5 Pope John Paul II. 1987. Encyclcial letter Solicitudo rei socialis No. 41 (emphasis
original). Available via
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jpii_enc_30121987_sollicitudo-rei-socialis_en.html
6 Id. (emphasis original)
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The Church’s social doctrine “finds its essential foundation in biblical revelation and
the tradition of the Church,” 7 and it also makes use of philosophy, for, as the
Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (2004) explains, “[b]y means of
reason, the Church’s social doctrine espouses philosophy in its own internal logic . . .
. It is philosophy . . . that shows the reasonableness and acceptability of shining the
light of the Gospel on society . . . .” 8 In addition to philosophy, the Church’s social
doctrine is informed by the human sciences and the social sciences, because while
the principles of the social order are natural and therefore unchanging, social
realities “change over time with social developments.” 9 Social changes call for the
fresh application – and indeed sometimes the discovery or re-discovery – of
permanently valid principles, always under the authoritative guidance of divine
revelation. 10 When he named the principle of subsidiarity in Quadregesimo Anno
and described it as a “most weighty” (“gravissimum”) principle, Pius also
acknowledged it as “fixed and unshakable” (“fixum . . . immotumque”). 11 The Church
proposes subsidiarity, then, not as a “policy” or a mere political preference, but
instead as one among the unchangeable ontological principles of the socio-political
order.
II.

The Compendium introduces subsidiarity by stating that the principle “is
among the most constant and characteristic directives of the Church’s social
doctrine and has been present since the first great social encyclical,” a reference to
Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum (1891), the fortieth anniversary of which Pius XI
celebrated in Quadragesimo anno. While Rerum novarum did indeed contain the
rudiments of the conceptual structure of subsidiarity 12, it would take until
Quadragesimo anno, the subtitle of which is “On the Restoration of the Social Order
and Perfecting It Conformably to the Precepts of the Gospel,” for the term to enter
the lexicon of Catholic social doctrine. 13 Or, more precisely, what entered there was

Compendium, supra note 3, at No. 74 (emphasis omitted)
Compendium, supra note 3, at No. 77
9 Pope Pius XII quoted in Hittinger, Russell (2008). The coherence of the four basic
principles of Catholic social doctrine: an interpretation. Available via
http://www.pass.va/content/dam/scienzesociali/pdf/actapass14.pdf. Note 5.
10 Compendium, supra note 3, at No. 85 (emphasis omitted).
11 Id. at No. 79.
12 Pope Leo XIII. 1891. Encyclical letter Rerum novarum. Nos. 29, 36. Available via
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_lxiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum_en.html
13 It is telling that the widely respected Catholic Encyclopedia published in 1917
does not so much as contain an entry for subsidiarity (though it does include one for
suburbicarian dioceses), but the New Catholic Encyclopedia (second edition 2003)
does devote an entry, of not quite three pages, to the term.
7
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the phrase “servato hoc ‘subsidiarii’ officii principio,” which means “in observance of
the principle of ‘subsidiary’ function.” The Latin work subsidium, the focal meaning
of which is “help,” had been attested since Roman times. 14 Pius’s subsidiarium was a
neologism. 15 The pope does not identify the source of the linguistic novum his text
sets off in quotation marks, but we know from external evidence that it represents
the Latinization of an earlier Italian neologism by Luigi Taparelli D’Azeglio, the
Jesuit whose thought Pius XI recommended by name, quite remarkably, in his
encyclical Divini Ilius, promulgated in 1929, just two years before the promulgation
of Quadragesimo Anno. 16
A crucial link in the genealogy of the emergence of the principle of
subsidiarity is Taparelli’s experience of a “conversion,” in 1825, to Thomism, the
philosophical theology of St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). 17 By virtue of this
conversion, Taparelli became an instigator of a paradigm-shifting intellectual
movement. Specifically, Taparelli was in the vanguard of Catholics who re-learned
the learning of St. Thomas which had been mostly lost, except in the caricatured
form in which it was ridiculed by the protagonists of Enlightenment philosophy,
since the early seventeenth century. Taparelli taught as professor in the recently refounded Jesuit seminary in Rome, where, as providence would have it, Gioacchino
Vincenzo Pecci was his student. Half a century later, Pecci, now as Pope Leo XIII,
would inaugurate his pontificate by publishing the programmatic encyclical Aeterni
patris (1878) calling for the recovery, development, and application of Thomism
throughout the Church.
On the history of the usage of “subsidium” in ancient times, see Lewis and Short, A
Latin Dictionary, 1781. On its usage during the Middle Ages, see DuCange et al.,
Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis (Niort: L. Favre, 1883-87). Available via
http://ducange.enc.sorbonne.fr/SUBSIDIUM
15 On earlier uses of the neologism, see Leys, Ad (1995). Ecclesiological impacts of
the principle of subsidiarity. Kampen: Uitgeverij Kok. 75-78.
14

Specifically, he recommends Taparelli’s textbook Saggio teoretico di Diritto
Naturale (A Theoretical Treatise on Natural Right, Based on Fact) (1840-43), “a work
never sufficiently praised and recommended to university students.” No. 50 n.33.
Saggio has not been translated into English, and very little has been written about
Taparelli in English. On the various influences behind Quadragesimo anno, we have
the detailed first-hand report of the leading ghostwriter, Oswald von Nell-Breuning,
“The Drafting of Quadragesimo Anno. 1986. In: Curran, C and McCormick R (eds).
Readings in moral theology No. 5: official Catholic social teaching. 60-68.
17 Behr, Thomas C. 2003. Luigi Taparelli D’Azeglio, S.J. (1793-1862) and the
Development of Scholastic Natural-Law Thought As a Science of Society and Politics.
Journal of Markets and Morality. 6:99-115. 100. See also Behr, Thomas. 2000.
Luigi Taparelli and the Nineteenth-Century Neo-Scholastic ‘Revolution’ in Natural
Law and Catholic Social Sciences.” Ph.D. diss., SUNY Buffalo.
16
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Modern political theory tended to hold, in one way or another, that “[w]e do
not know what man is.” 18 Taparelli grasped, in particular, “that the post-Cartesian
abandonment of the hylomorphism of Aristotle and Aquinas came at a steep cultural
and political price. Unlike the natural sciences, where differences of opinion,
Taparelli analogized, have no effect on the actual course of nature, mistaken
metaphysical assumptions have a direct bearing on the direction of individual wills
and lead to disorder in society.” 19 Taparelli’s textbook, Saggio teoretico di difitto
naturale appoggiato sul fatto, Theoretical Treatise on Natural Right Based on Fact,
the study commended by Pius XI, manifested “[h]is thoroughly Thomistic intention .
. . to merge a deductive theoretical approach with an inductive historico-sociological
approach in a dialectical method that would form the basis of a modern science of
society and politics.” 20 Taparelli believed that he had found in Thomas an empirical
method that could discover universal laws of nature in constellations of individual
facts, and it was on the basis of those universal laws, one of which is the principle of
subsidiarity, that Taparelli insisted that the post-revolutionary socio-political order
must be structured.
Taparelli carried on this work of recovery and development not only as a
seminary professor but also as a leading contributor to the La Civilta Cattolica. That
influential journal, co-founded by Taparelli and another Jesuit, represented nothing
less than a wholesale movement to realize what the journal’s name means, Catholic
civilization. Catholic counter-revolutionaries had not been wanting since 1790, of
course, but it took the revolutions that convulsed most of Europe in 1848 for a
systematic presentation of the Catholic position to emerge, and emerge it did on the
pages of La Civilta Cattolica starting in 1850, thanks to the endorsement of
(including loans from) Pius IX. The contributors to La Civilta have been accused of
“intransigence.” 21 The charge is true if it be understood as confirming the Civilta’s
confidence in the certainty of its counter-revolutionary position. “[T]he Roman
journal believed that respect for the authority of the Word in the Church was itself
historically responsible for building confidence in the value of Reason in the first
place,” 22 and this very confidence is the context in which to single out “Taparelli’s
openness to new ideas.” 23 The concept neologized as “subsidiarium” was just that, a
Manent, Pierre. 1998. The city of man. Trans. Marc A. LePain. Princeton:
Princeton University Press. 124
19 Behr, supra note <>, at 100
20 Behr, supra note <>, 102-03
21 Rao, John. 1999. Removing the Blindfold: Nineteenth-Century Catholics & the
Myth of Modern Freedom. Ch. 1, 32-33. Available via
http://www.romanforum.org/wp-content/uploads/rem_01.pdf
22 Rao, John. 2011. Black legends and the light of the world. Forest Lake, MN.:
Remnant Press. 475
23 Rao, Removing, supra note <>, at 34. W.E. von Ketteler (1811-1877), Bishop of
Mainz, also converged on the social principle that would later be called subsidiarty.
Rather than from a neo-scholastic analysis, von Ketteler reached the principle
through a combination of Romantic and liberal thought. See Leys, Impacts, supra
note <>, at 25-40.
18

5

new idea creatively culled from the depths of the Catholic philosophical and
theological tradition that had roots in Greek philosophical speculation.
III.

Taparelli’s socio-political philosophy is thick with fresh insights and
corresponding neologisms, such as “Hypostatic Right,” the novel title under which
Taparelli gathers the natural and just relations among the countless and varied
associations that humans tend to form. Both words carry freight. First, “right” is, of
course, a jurisprudential commonplace of ancient vintage, and easily given a familiar
meaning that would obscure Taparelli’s insight. The modern mind must resist, as
Taparelli did, the philosophical prejudice according to which only individual
rational substances, but not groups or societies, are the subject of right and of rights.
Subsidiarity is a principle of “group right” and, derivatively, of “group rights,” but, as
we are about to see, in a far subtler structure than is commonly heard today.
Second, then, Taparelli’s Italian neologism ipotattico, of which the English hypostatic
is a transliteration, is a borrowing from the Greek word hypotaxis, which refers to
the rules of grammar that govern the modalities of coordination among clauses and,
specifically, the arrangement of subordinate clauses within the structure of a
grammatically complex sentence. The concept of hypotaxis, as Thomas Behr has
observed, was the starting point for “an excellent extension into the neologism
dritto ipotattico to convey the rights of social groupings, within their just
relationships, organized toward the common good.” 24 Behr goes on to explain that
“the Greek hypo taxis can be rendered directly in Latin as sub sedeo [to sit below].
The Latin expression subsidia applied, then, not just to mean help but in the first
instance to auxiliary troops within the Roman legion, as they ‘sat below’ ready in
reserve to support the battle.” 25 Taparelli’s critical insight was that all societies,
other than the most basic ones such as family or simple partnerships, are always
composed of other societies, and there exist social rules governing the relations
among such nested and overlapping societies.
Specifically, subjacent societies are to provide “help” from the bottom up,
each by performing its own proper (“proprium”) work and by referring the fruits of
thereof to the larger and more perfect societies -- including the societas perfecta that
is the state -- in the achievement of their respective common goods. 26 We can say,
then, that “the point of subsidiarity is a normative structure of plural social forms,
not a trickling down of power or aid.” 27 It is important to emphasize this point,
because subsidiarity is often but erroneously described as a matter of devolution or
smallness of scale. In Taparelli’s thought, however, and, in turn, in Catholic social
doctrine, it is neither. Pace much modern political theory, power is not all held at
Behr, supra note <>, at 105.
Behr, supra note <>, at 105.
26 Behr, supra note <>, at 104-05.
27 Hittinger, Russell. 2006. Introduction to modern Catholicism. In The teachings
of modern Christianity on law, politics, & human nature, eds. J. Witte and F.
Alexander, 3-38. New York: Columbia university press. 23
24
25
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the top in the first place, so the possibility that subsidiaritys is a devolution norm
turns out to be based on a fallacious premise; smallness, furthermore, is not per se
good (or bad). The principle of subsidiarty recognizes, instead, “that there are
plural authorities and agents having their ‘proper’ (not necessarily, lowest) duties
and rights with regard to the common good.” 28
It is against this background that we can at last approach Pope Pius XI’s
articulation of the principle of subsidiary function in Quadragesimo Anno:

79. As history abundantly proves, it is true that on account of changed
conditions many things which were done by small associations in former
times cannot be done now save by large associations. Still, that most
weighty principle, which cannot be set aside or changed, remains fixed
and unshaken in social philosophy: Just as it is gravely wrong to take
from individuals what they can accomplish by their own initiative and
industry and give it to the community, so also it is an injustice and at the
same time a grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a
greater and higher association what lesser and subordinate
organizations can do. For every social activity ought of its very nature to
furnish help to the members of the body social, and never destroy and
absorb them.

80. The supreme authority of the State ought, therefore, to let
subordinate groups handle matters and concerns of lesser importance,
which would otherwise dissipate its efforts greatly. Thereby the State
will more freely, powerfully, and effectively do all those things that
belong to it alone because it alone can do them: directing, watching,
urging, restraining, as occasion requires and necessity demands.
Therefore, those in power should be sure that the more perfectly a
graduated order is kept among the various associations, in observance of
the principle of "subsidiary function," the stronger social authority and
effectiveness will be the happier and more prosperous the condition of
the State. 29

As stated in Quadragesimo Anno, then, the principle of subsidiarity enjoys both
positive and negative aspects. Negatively, it is a principle of non-absorption of
lower societies by higher societies, above all by the state. This is the aspect of
subsidiarity that is commonly invoked today, but it represents only half the story.
Positively, subsidiarity is also the principle that when aid is given to a particular
society, including by the state, it be for the purpose of encouraging and

Hittinger, Introduction, supra note <>, at 23.
Pope Pius XI. 1931. Encyclical letter Quadragesimo anno. Nos. 79-80. Available
via http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_pxi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno_en.html
28
29
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strengthening that society; correlatively, flourishing societies contribute to the
flourishing of the greater societies of which they are so many irreducible parts.
In sum, “[e]very social activity,” Pope Pius XII (r. 1939-1958) explained, “is
for its nature subsidiarity; it must serve as a support to the members of the social
body and never destroy or absorb them.” 30 It bears emphasis that the libertarian
misinterpretation of subsidiarity, which reduces the principle to little more than its
non-absorption aspect, is falsified by the popes’ repeated insistence that the state
has a right, and sometimes a duty, to intervene, as Pope John XXIII (r. 1958-1963)
made unmistakable in the encyclical Mater et Magistra (1961): “in [its] work of
directing, stimulating, co-ordinating, supplying and integrating, [the state’s] guiding
principle must be the ‘principle of subsidiary function’ formulated by Pius XI in
Quadragesimo Anno.” 31
The full significance of the principle of subsidiarity comes into focus if we
attend to why it took until Quadragesimo Anno for the Church definitively to
articulate so basic a principle. Until the Revolution of 1789, the Church lived by this
as-yet-unnamed principle -- and flourished thanks to its countless manifestations -without being made to feel self-conscious about it. It was perfectly congenial to the
Church to manifest her nature as the Mystical Body of Christ in the world through
the diverse and irreducible operations of her many social members or organs. The
Dominicans did work that was different from the Carthusians’ work. (We will have
more to say about these two Orders’ respective works below). Likewise, no one was
tempted to fold Christian Brothers’ schools into Benedictines’. Similarly, the
Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of Saint John of Jerusalem of Rhodes and of
Malta (Knights of Malta) was not at risk of being suppressed or dissolved into
Equestrian Order of the Holy Sepluchre of Jerusalem. All of the just-mentioned
associations, along with many more, survive to this day in the life of the Church, and
each continues to refer the gift of its unique service to the common good.
Such associations, however, represent exactly what the architects of the
modern monolithic nation state wished to eclipse, elide, and eliminate, as
circumstances and force would permit. This idea of the all-encompassing Leviathan
state that began with Hobbes assumed the following form in the French Declaration
of the Rights of Man (1789): “The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in
the nation. No body nor individual may exercise any authority which does not
Pope Pius XII, La elevatezza e la nobilita (February 20, 1946), quoted in
Hittinger, Intro., 23 n. 63.
31 Pope John XXIII. 1961. Encyclical letter Mater et Magistra No. 53. Available via
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_xxiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jxxiii_enc_15051961_mater_en.html See also Pope John Paul II. 1991. Encyclical
letter Centesimus annus. No 48. Available via
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jpii_enc_01051991_centesimus-annus_en.html See also Calvez, J., and Perrin, J. 1961.
The Church and social justice: the social teachings of the popes from Leo XIII to Pius
XII. Trans. J. R. Kirwan. 328-37.
30
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proceed directly from the nation.” 32 It was this idea that took coercive juridical
force, two years later, when the French state passed a law de-creating corporations:

‘Since the abolition of all kinds of corporations of citizens of the same
occupation and profession is one of the fundamental bases of the French
Constitution, re-establishment thereof under any pretext or pretence or
form whatsoever is forbidden.’ (sec. 1) ‘Citizens of the same occupation
or profession . . . may not, when they are together, name either president,
secretaries, or trustees, keep accounts, pass decrees of resolution, or
draft regulations concerning their alleged common interests.’ (sec. 2) 33

At a legislative stroke, then, the plurality of society was reduced, as least
aspirationally, to the unity of the state through the elimination of the countless and
varied societies that previously were nested within political society. The Church
knew all along what was wrong about this, but it took time for the Church to
articulate, thanks to the insights of Taparelli and others, the principle of “subsidiary
function” as the name for the reason to condemn the summary execution of
societies.
IV.

Commentators who treat subsidiarity as a matter of devolution or simple
smallness of scale overlook the deep ontological springs of the principle. The
principle of subsidiarity does not purport to create a social ontology. Instead, the
principle of subsidiarity recognizes, and thus honors, the ontological facts about how
individuals associate for the performance of unique functions which are so many
irreducible contributions to the common good. It recognizes, specifcally, that not
just individuals have functions to perform, but so too groups. At the same time as he
was articulating and applying the principle of subsidiarity, Pope Pius XI was also
developing the complementary doctrine of social “munera,” and the pope’s creative
extension of this sacral language into the socio-political realm helps to show the
true significance and ontological substrate of the principle of subsidiarity function.
Munera is the plural of the Latin noun munus. Serviceably translated as
“function,” munus also denotes gift-giving: the Magi offered munera to the Christ
child. The key insight is that the performance of social functions constitutes the
giving of gifts for the common good. Such functions are assigned, explicitly or
implicitly, either by nature, as in the state and the family, or by supernature (and
nature), as in the Carthusians and the Sovereign Military Order of Malta. The
performance of these functions is, moreover, what Pius XI meant by “social justice,”
another new concept in the development of Catholic social doctrine. 34 As Russell
Hittinger explains, “for Pius XI, social justice is nothing other than the manifold
Stewart, John. 1951. A Documentary History of the French Revolution. New
York: Macmillan. 114.
33 Chapelier Law, 14 June 1791. Stewart, supra <>, at 165.
34 Shields, Leo William. 1941. The history and meaning of the term social justice.
Notre Dame: Notre Dame. 26-73.
32
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organicity of the common good; or, to put it another way, it is the demand that the
common good be brought about through organizations, institutions, and groups.” 35
In Pius’s own words, social justice is realized when “each individual member is
given what it needs for the exercise of its proper function. . . . all that is necessary
for the exercise of his social munus.” 36 Subsidiarity, then, is a principle derivative of
social justice, according to which each member of society is capacitated to perform
its social role for the common good. 37
An example of what Pius XI meant by the performance of a social munus may
be helpful, and we can do no better than to attend to what that pope said about the
aforementioned Carthusians, founded in the south of France in 1084 by St. Bruno of
Cologne. The case of the Carthusians, the Church’s most contemplatively-focused
monastic order, is especially instructive, for the revolutionaries nursed a special
hatred of the contemplative orders, for their purportedly passive presence in the
social order silently denied the exigency and sufficiency of “liberty, equality, and
fraternity,” in favor of the social Kingship of Christ and His demand for social
worship. So, already in 1790 the self-laicized French state enacted the Decree
Suppressing Monastic Vows, which began with this: “The constitutional law of the
kingdom shall no longer recognize solemn monastic vows of persons of either sex.
Consequently, the regular orders and congregations in which such vows have been
made are and shall remain suppressed in France, and no similar ones may be
established in the future. All individuals of either sex living in monasteries and
religious houses may leave them . . . .” 38
Following a century of vicissitudes of Catholic resistance and more than
ample pushback by the successive Republics, the government raised the stakes still
further by enacting the Law of Associations (1901), which provides (in part) as
follows: “No religious congregation may be formed without an authorization given
by a law which shall determine the conditions of its operation. No congregation may
establish any new foundation except by virtue of a decree of the Council of State.
The dissolution of a congregation or the closing of any establishment may be
declared by a cabinet decree.” 39 Few of the required “authorizations” were granted.
The Law, which provided for the “liquidation” of religious orders’ property, was

Hittinger, Russell. 2002. Social pluralism and subsidiarity in Catholic social
doctrine. Annales theologici 16: 385-408. 393
36 The larger context includes distinguishing “social justice” from the more familiar
concept of commutative justice. See Pope Pius XI. 1937. Encyclical letter Divini
Redemptoris. No. 51. Available via
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_pxi_enc_19031937_divini-redemptoris_en.html
37 Hittinger, Pluralism, supra note <>, 394.
38 MacLear, J.F. (ed.) (1995). Church and state in the modern age. New York:
Oxford. 77.
39 MacLear, supra note <>, at 294-95.
35
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executed with special ferocity against the Carthusians, 40 as the New York Times
reported on March 27, 1903. 41 The soldiers came at three o’clock in the morning,
while the community was gathered to sing the Divine Office in church, and arrested
the monks one at a time. Without the monks’ having enjoyed so much as a proper
hearing, the community of monks dispersed, its property liquidated, and its
common life of prayer succeeded by men driven into diaspora. As Matthew Arnold
wrote of the affair and its consequences: No longer “[w]ith penitential cries they
kneel/ And wrestle; rising then, with bare / And white uplifted faces stand, /
Passing the Host from hand to hand.” 42
The dissipation of the Carthusians’ irreducibly social munus, captured so
exquisitely but painfully by Arnold, would have been very much on the mind of Pope
Pius XI when, in 1924, he approved the Carthusians’ revised statutes in the
extraordinary form of an Apostolic Constitution that included a lengthy encomium
to their shared way of life, of which the following is indicative:
According to his great kindness, God, who is ever attentive to the needs
and well-being of his Church, chose BRUNO, a man of eminent sanctity,
for the work of bringing the contemplative life back to the glory of its
original integrity. To that intent Bruno founded the Carthusian Order,
imbued it with his own spirit and provided it with those laws which
might efficaciously induce its members to advance speedily along the
way of inward sanctity and of the most rigorous penance, to the
preclusion of every sort of exterior ministry and office: laws which
would also impel them to persevere with steadfast hearts in the same
austere and hard life. 43

Pius goes on to make unmistakable that the heart of the matter is the capacity of
each group to perform its own particular work, in this case contemplation, and to
refer its effects to the common good. Writing a year later, in the encyclical Rerum
Ecclesiae, Pius explained the reason for his unusual commendation of the
Carthusians’ unique gift to the work of the Church, and went on to generalize the
point with reference to the work of a Trappist Cistercian monastery of
contemplatives, some one hundred in number, in what was then called Peking: “It
is, therefore, not to be questioned that these hermits, while they guard intact the
spirit of their holy Founder and therefore do not engage in an active life,

Brennan, Patrick McKinley. 2009. Differentiating Church and state (without
losing the Church). The Georgetown journal of law and public policy. 7:29-49. 3033
41 Quoted in Brennan, supra note <>.
42 Quoted in Brennan, supra note <>.
43 Pope Pius XI. 1924. Apostolic Constitution Umbratilem. Available via
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/apost_constitutions/documents/hf_pxi_apc_19240708_umbratilem_lt.html
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nevertheless they prove themselves of great assistance in the successful work of the
missions.” 44
The Carthusians continue to flourish throughout the world to this day, but in
the monastery founded by St. Bruno before France as we know it even existed, they
live now as tenants of the French government. The Law of Associations of 1901 has
not been repealed. The conditions of “passing the Host from hand to hand” remain
vulnerable to legislative violence in violation of the non-absorption aspect of the
principle of subsidiarity, and this is but one among countless possible examples of
why the Church was compelled to resist the revolutionaries’ push to dissolve the
organs of the Church into the heap of civil society.
V.

Taparelli’s new idea recognized by Pius XI as a “fixed and unshakable”
principle of the social order soon made its way into the leading mid-twentieth
century studies of Catholic thought on the socio-political order, and attention to
some aspects of those expositions will illuminate facets of subsidiarity sometimes
left underdeveloped at the level of magisterial exposition. The distinguished
Georgetown political scientist Heinrich Rommen (1897-1967), glossing the relevant
language of Quadragesimo anno, explains that “the principle of subsidiarity applies . .
. to the different natural or freely created communities in the social order. Social life
is governed by the principles of autonomy, of hierarchy and intervention.” With
respect to the third principle, intervention, Rommen stresses that “[t]he purpose of
this intervention is the reconstruction of the order, the rehabilitation of the function,
not the abolition of the part or the substitution of the state for the lower society.” 45
Subsidiarity cannot, therefore, be understood as a principle militating in favor of
smallness of scale per se. 46
Rather, subsidiarity is an ontological principle of competencies or, to return
to Pius XI’s complementary insight, munera. The principle derives its ontological
traction, so to speak, from the fact that subsidiary function is an aspect of the
Pope Pius XI. 1926. Encyclical letter Rerum Ecclesiae (emphasis added).
Available via
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_pxi_enc_28021926_rerum-ecclesiae_en.htmlPius certainly did not imply that the
Carthusians’ or Trappists’ only function and gift were the ones he emphasized.
45 Rommen, Heinrich. 1947. The state in Catholic social thought. St. Louis, MO:
Herder. 302, 303
46 Johannes Messner is in accord: “The reality of the common good, therefore, is
impaired insofar as it is pursued by means of a diminution of the spheres of
responsibility and of competence belonging to the members of society. . . . Here,
then, is the fundamental task of social reform today: to reform society with a view to
the organization of strong autonomous bodies, both regional and occupational. . . .”
Messner, Johannes. 1965. Social ethics in the natural law tradition. Trans. J.J.
Doherty. St. Louis, MO: Herder. 210, 214
44
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common good, as the distinguished Austrian theologian and social theorist Johannes
Messner (1891-1984) explains:
The principle of subsidiary function . . . means that the common good
does not establish for society any right or authority over what the
individual person or the member society can do by his own power. We
say that “the common good” establishes no right for society beyond this
limit, in order to emphasize the fact that every right to social activity is
founded on the common good, the end of society, and that hence the
subsidiary principle is inherent in the nature of the common good.
Basically, therefore, the common good principle and the subsidiary
principle are one. . . . The common good confers powers and at the same
time limits them: it empowers them to do everything necessary for its
actual realization, but only that. The common good principle and the
principle of subsidiary function are two sides of one and the same thing.
Thus it was that Pius XI, when he coined the term “subsidiary function,”
called it the “fundamental principle of social philosophy,” . . . . while Leo
described the common good principle as “after God, the first and last law
in society.”

As Pius XI elaborated in the doctrine of social munera, the principle of subsidiarity
function is a concrete principle, not merely a formal principle. It has content, not
just form: it “declares a quite definite distribution of competencies based on the
order of being and of ends.” 47 Although subsidiarity does not create a social
ontology, it discerns and announces the one ordained by the common good.
The functions and competencies of morally upright associations exemplify
genuine authority, that is, the right of dominion and command within their
respective spheres. It is these genuine authorities, of course, that Leviathan in all of
its successive instantiations wished to vaporize, and the principle of subsidiary
function responds by observing that the vigor and vitality of such authorities are
required by the common good. To that end, Messner notes, such societies are to
engage in “[a]s much self-help as possible” 48 to promote and sustain their respective
competencies, for (it bears repeating) “the Latin word subsidiarius, although it
derives from subsidium, does not connote help pure and simple in its fundamental
military sense, but rather in the sense of ‘reserve,’ a word used of those forces which
were to provide help when the frontline troops failed.” 49 Right and authority are
preceded by social obligation.
An important but sometimes unwelcome(d) consequence of subsidiarity’s
being the inverse of which the obverse is the common good follows: the application
of the principle of subsidiarity always depends on the particulars of the given
situation. Those who look for the certainty of geometry in practical science will be
frustrated by the fact, observed by Messner, that “the range of its authority widens
47
48
49
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or contracts according to the energy and will of the individual members of society to
undertake responsibility in looking after their rights.” 50 Messner is quick to add,
though, that (1) the burden of proof that an extension of authority is on the society
seeking the extension and (2) any intervention and subvention are to be arranged
“to make them superfluous as quickly as possible.” 51 Like other forms of justice,
social justice -- from which, as we have seen, the principle of subsidiarity is
derivative -- will never take perfect shape in this fallen world. The more the work of
a particular state can be accomplished through the competencies and authorities of
the many and varied societies that are nested within that state, however, the richer
that particular state’s socio-political order. States that are frequently obliged to
intervene to rescue societies that lack the vigor necessary to fulfill their functions
will soon be sapped of their own strength or, in the alternative, become totalitarian
as they succumb to the temptation to intervene not to restore but, instead, to
colonize.
I have emphasized that the principle of subsidiarity function is a principle of
social pluralism, and, in fact, Jacques Maritain (1882-1973), perhaps the most
influential neo-Thomist of the twentieth century, eschewed the term subsidiarity in
favor of “pluralism,” “the pluralist principle,” and the like. “As opposed to the
various totalitarian conceptions of society in vogue today,” Maritain wrote in 1935,
“the conception here is of a pluralist body politic bringing together in its organic
unity a diversity of social groupings and structures, each of them embodying
positive liberties.” 52 Maritain then quoted the sentence of Quadragesimo anno that
calls attention to the “injustice” and “grave evil” of withdrawing from groups
functions that they themselves can perform, and concluded as follows: “Civil society
is made up not only of individuals, but of particular societies formed by them, and a
pluralist body politic would allow to these societies the greatest autonomy possible
and would diversify its own internal structure in keeping with what is typically
required by their nature.” 53 Maritain’s preference for “pluralism” rather than
subsidiarity highlights an important but often overlooked aspect of the doctrine, but
it also invites a misunderstanding. In contemporary political theory, “pluralism” is
typically commended either as a way of checking power with other power or,
instead, as an acknowledgment of socio-ethical diversity. Maritain, however,
understands groups as first of all occasions and opportunities for positive liberties,
and these are not all created equal, let alone created for the purpose of producing a
“thermodynamics of power” 54: “The pluralist city multiplies liberties; the measure
Id. at 214
Id. at 215
52 Maritain J. (1935). Integral humanism. In Bird O. (ed). Integral humanism,
Freedom in the modern world, and A letter on independence, The Collected Works
of Jacques Maritain. 1996. South Bend, University of Notre Dame Press. Vol. 11,
256
53 Maritain, Integral, supra <>, at 256. See also Maritain, Jacques. 1951. Man and
the State, 11, 22, 23, 123, 150
54 Hittinger, Coherence, supra note <>, at 108.
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of these is not uniform, and varies according to a principle of proportionality.” 55
The reason for respecting morally upright groups is that they exercise irreducible
social functions, some more important than others. 56 A collateral benefit of such
plural authorities is that they can, perhaps, thwart totalitarianism, a point to which I
return at the end.
VI.

First, however, we do well to emphasize exactly what the instrumentalist
justification of social pluralism -- power-checking-power -- wholly overlooks: the
intrinsic perfections that make society or association worth undertaking for its own
sake. As Taparelli saw, the occlusion of the ontology of association is part and
parcel of modernity’s abandonment of the Aristotelico-Thomistic understanding of
man as a naturally social animal. Modern thought would have it that the human
person is “social” only by accident or desperation, sometimes memorialized in a
fiction called the “social contract.” The truth and value of the principle of
subsidiarity come into relief if we zero in on the fact that what it protects and
preserves is the intrinsic and not merely instrumental value of associating. Catholic
social doctrine frequently refers to this as “solidarity:”

Solidarity highlights in a particular way the intrinsic social nature of the
human person. . . . Solidarity must be seen above all in its value as a
moral virtue that determines the order of institutions. . . . Solidarity is
also an authentic moral virtue, . . . a firm and persevering determination
to commit oneself to the common good. . . . . Solidarity rises to the rank
of fundamental social virtue since it places itself in the sphere of justice.
It is a virtue directed par excellence to the common good . . . . 57

Solidarity is never just one thing, but rather the varied ensemble of firm dispositions
that serve the common good by a unity of action for the ends of particular, upright
societies.
In defending the value and integrity of the societies “formed in the bosom of
the commonwealth,” Leo XIII quoted Thomas’s Contra Impugnantes (1256?), an
occasional work usually titled in English “An Apology for the Religious Orders.” 58
There, Thomas defended the new mendicant form of religious life against
contemporary attack by conservatives who wished the Church to confine
contemplatives to monasteries, rather than allow them to travel and teach as
participants in the work of these recently founded orders, including the Dominicans
to which Thomas himself belonged. Thomas defends the right of individuals to form
such community on the ground that to associate is already to “communicate,” which,
Maritain, Integral Humanism, supra note <>, at 261.
Maritain, Integral Humanism, at 267-68.
57 Compendium, supra note <>, at Nos. 192, 193 (emphasis and internal quotations
omitted)
58 Rerum novarum, supra note <>, text at nn. 36 and 37
55
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in turn, is to make gifts common, as reflected by the fact that the etymology of
“communicate” is co- plus munus. As Hittinger explains:

Although societas is an analogous term, every society, [Thomas] argues,
is constituted by “communications” whereby goods are given and
received. In Thomas’s works, every analogous use of the word societas is
mirrored by uses of the word communicatio: communicatio oeconomica,
communicatio spiritualis, communicatio civilis, and so forth. The word
communicatio simply means making something common, one rational
agent participating in the life of another. Society, for Thomas, is not a
thing, but an activity. 59

Thomas’s defense of the right to associate -- in contravention, it should be noted, of
settled norms of social class and vested privilege -- rests on the arresting claim that
“to prevent free men and women from associating for the purpose of
communicating gifts is contrary to the natural law. It is tantamount,” Hittinger
continues, “to denying to rational agents the perfection proper to their nature, and
denying to the commonweal goods it would not enjoy were it not for free
associations.” 60 It is tantamount, in other words, to denying humans the solidarity
by which they, as social beings, are perfected. The rationale of Thomas’s defense of
the freedom claimed by the mendicant Dominicans extends not only to Carthusians
and all other ecclesial societies but also, in laicized form, to all groups in which good
gifts are communicated, from the Boy Scouts, to The Salvation Army, the Benevolent
and Protective Order of Elks, labor unions, and so forth.
The meaning of subsidiarity, solidarity, and the common good in Catholic
social doctrine turn on what we mean by society. Thomas saw with perfect clarity
that a society is neither a mere aggregate of individuals nor a mere partnership, but
a unity of order that “does not just aim at a common objective, but intends to have it
brought about by united action.” 61 As Yves Simon observes, “[m]ere partnership
does not do anything to put an end to the solitude of the partners,” 62 but in a true
society, by contrast, corporate unity is one of the reasons for action. Someone
leaving a partnership can export his share; the common good of a society, however,
cannot be divided, only shared and participated in. Each participant in a society
perfects himself and the other members of the society by communicating goods as
gifts, and these are in turn help to higher societies. 63 “[W]e are made unto the image
of God not only because the individual person possesses the excellence of a rational
Hittinger, Russell. 2003. The First Grace: Rediscovering the Natural Law in a
Post-Christian World. Wilmington: ISI. 271
60 Hittinger, First grace, supra note <>, at 272.
61 Hittinger, Coherence, supra note <>, at 92.
62 Simon, Yves. 1993. Philosophy of democratic government. Notre Dame: Notre
Dame Press. 64
63 For a beautiful phenomenology of association, see Rao, Blindfold, supra note <>,
at Ch. 2. Available via http://www.romanforum.org/wpcontent/uploads/rem_02.pdf
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nature, but also because we must cause good in others.” 64 When men and women
aim to unite to do this, a society -- a reality distinct in dignity -- results, and this is
what the principle of subsidiarity protects as a matter of social justice and the
common good.

Social justice is the virtue whereby all persons (not just the state) refer
the ensemble of their relations to the common good. This is why
subsidiarity is not merely an issue of commutation or distribution, but
rather manifests itself in the arranging of things in such wise that the
operations of a heterogeneous whole are harmonized with regard to the
common good. 65

Social justice and subsidiarity require that the sociality of society be preserved and
harmonized, and no argument to benefits external to a particular society itself will
prevail, unless there be moral reason to dissolve the society.
In sum, the principle of subsidiarity falsifies the proposition advanced by
Rousseau and implemented by the revolutionaries: “It is of necessity that no partial
society should exist in the state.” 66 Quite the contrary, societies are the perfecting
opportunities for naturally social beings to cause good in others, including through
the supernatural assistance of grace. Pope John Paul II stressed this in Centesimus
annus (1991) 67, his encyclical celebrating the hundredth anniversary of Rerum
Novarum, and Pope Benedict XVI (r. 2004-) pursued the demands of subsidiary
function in his first encyclical, Deus Caritas Est (2005):

We do not need a State which regulates and controls everything, but a
state which, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, generously
acknowledges and supports initiatives arising from the difference social
forces and combines spontaneity with closeness to those in need. The
Church is one of those living forces: she is alive with the love enkindled
by the Spirit of Christ. This love do not simply offer people material help,
but refreshment and care for their souls . . . . 68

Subsidiarity is a principle to which Pope Benedict has returned time and again as he
addresses a world that ever threatens to pinion the lone individual against the
Leviathan state: “When those responsible for the public good attune themselves to
the natural human desire for self-governance based on subsidiarity, they leave space
for individual responsibility and initiative, but most importantly, they leave space
64
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for love (cf. Rom 13:8; Deus Caritas Est, 28), which always remains ‘the most
excellent way’ (cf. 1 Cor 12:31).” 69
Conclusion
The organic web of Christendom -- structured and enlivened by the as-yetunnamed principle of subsidiary function -- was succeeded by nation-states that,
acting out their pretensions to absolute sovereignty, eviscerated societies internal to
themselves and to the Church yet lacked, at the same stroke, any principal for
coordinating global community. Taparelli addressed the former problem, as we
have seen, but also the latter, each thanks to the principle of subsidiary function.
With respect to the latter problem, Taparelli saw the inevitable trajectory of the
then-emergent global community, and grasped, moreover, why, from the properly
universalist perspective of Christianity, such development was in many respects
desirable. He also foresaw, however, some of the untenable consequences of a
world assembly of nation states shaped and ratified without benefit of the Church
exercising her true social role.
The recent popes, including Benedict XVI, have emphasized subsidiarity’s
place in rightly ordering global community. 70 The Catechism of the Catholic Church
(1991) affirms that place by way of crescendo: “The principle of subsidiarity is
opposed to all forms of collectivism. It sets limits for state intervention. It aims at
harmonizing the relationships between individuals and societies. It tends toward
the establishment of true international order.” 71 The outstanding question is why -or even whether -- one can reasonably expect a political culture that has shelved an
understanding of man’s intrinsic sociality and, furthermore, treats the Church on the
model of the Boy Scouts, that is, as just another group, to structure itself according
to the requirements of the common good. The pope who introduced subsidiarity
into Catholic social doctrine also taught, as had his predecessors, that the social
order cannot but fail if the divine right of the Church and of Christ the King is not
recognized. 72 It is no insult to the Boy Scouts to observe that they cannot
accomplish the work of the Church -- Christ-continued in the world -- for the benefit
69
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of all of political society, threatened as it is by totalitarianism and relativism.
Meanwhile, “[a]lthough the world knows it not, the most primordial law of ruling is
service, which is always the signature of the divine. Not sovereignty as the moderns
understand it, but rather a gift communicated for the good of another.” 73
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